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For nearly two decades, Islamic radicalization and the growth and development of 
global Islamism has dominated public media and policymaking discourse in Europe and 
America. Faced with terrorist attacks perpetrated by “home-grown” radicals, in Britain 
and across Europe and America, countering Islamic extremism from within has become 
a national and international priority. Hence, an understanding of what motivates some 
Muslims living in the west to reject so-called “western values” has been key. In the UK, 
government programs such as Prevent have sought, not uncontroversially, to identify 
“extremism” within communities before it becomes violent (Home Office 2011). Yet, 
overlooked in this discourse is an appreciation of Islamism’s origins and what might have 
made it appealing in Britain before 9/11 and the War on Terror. Analysis which values 
the long term causes of the British Muslim community’s marginalization in its own 
right is comparatively rare. Addressing this deficit I will argue, using East London as a 
case study, that understanding British Muslims as a community which felt its religion, 
values, and worldview to be under attack is key to understanding why many in Britain’s 
Muslim community began to turn to Islam for solutions to their political grievances.
Katherine Pye
Laidlaw Scholar, University of Oxford 
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 Clarifying a definition of Islamism is challenging. Definitions of “Islamist” used 
by politicians and the media have been robbed of theoretical significance, becoming 
synonymous with “extremist,” “radical,” “fundamentalist,” and “terrorist.”  As the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations criticised in 2013, “unfortunately, the term 
‘Islamist’ has become shorthand for ‘Muslims we don’t like,’” arguing that “the key issue 
with the term ‘Islamist’ is not its continued use; the issue is its use almost exclusively 
as an ill-defined pejorative” (Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 2013). 
For the purposes of this analysis, however, reclaiming Islamism in its purest sense is a 
useful endeavour. The term has the capacity to reflect an important shift taking place in 
this period, which can be located in a narrative of global Islamic revivalism. Islamism 
will therefore be defined in a thinner sense as outlined by Sheri Berman: “the belief that 
Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life” (Berman 2003). In short 
Islamism is living one’s life in accordance with Islamic principles, not just in the home 
but also following Qur’anic teaching on good governance. This parsimonious definition 
of Islamism permits a much broader and holistic focus on the wider changes taking place 
in the Muslim community at the time, including but not limited to the radicalization of 
young Muslims beginning in the mid-1990s.
 The vast majority of the literature on the British Muslim identity, social 
marginalization, and the shift towards Islamism focuses on Muslim reactions to 9/11. 
Muslim reactions to British foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 have been 
thoroughly examined, especially the ways in which the policies led to marginalization 
and the spread of anti-Western messages (Brighton 2007). However, it is increasingly 
recognized that the role of pre-9/11 events have been comparatively underexplored. 
In order to understand the development of Islam in Britain today, including the issue 
of radicalization, it is crucial to fully appreciate the long-term circumstances of its 
emergence. My paper, using the East London Muslim community, will analyze a chain of 
local, national, and global events to show that by the time policymakers were focussing 
on Islamic fundamentalism after 9/11, what they were analyzing was the culmination, 
not the beginning of an issue. As Jonathan Bronitsky argued in his study of the impact 
of the Bosnian war on Muslim radical groups in Britain:
 Unfortunately, attempts to decipher the emergence of this phenomenon have 
occasionally been impaired by myopia. Members of the media, policymakers and 
academics alike have often attributed Muslim radicalization solely to the West’s 
military action in Iraq and Afghanistan... (Bronitsky 2010)
 My study analyzes the era from 1988, the year of the publication of Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses and an ideological turning point in relations between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in the West, to 1997, the election of a new Labour government. 
The year 1997 marked a transition into a new era of foreign policy towards Muslim 
countries, the emergence of Islamic terrorism as a policy priority in Britain, and in 
domestic policy towards British Muslims. Many long-standing grievances under the 
Conservative government from 1979, such as lack of public funding for Islamic schools 
and the inclusion of religious status as a question in national censuses, were answered. 
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The decade from 1988-1997, as a result, was a formative period in the formation of a 
British Muslim identity and answering why by the end of the 20th century many turned 
to Islamic or Qur’an-based solutions to these grievances.
 In the years 1988-1997, the beginning of the decade leading up to 9/11, British 
Muslims felt themselves under attack on two fronts. Firstly, there was a widespread 
perception that Islamic values were being threatened by an onslaught of western 
civilization. There were fears that, in particular, secular attitudes towards topics such 
as gender relations, community values, and family life threatened Islamic principles 
and could prompt irreligion or even apostasy. Secondly, Muslims in Britain felt 
physically under attack, subject to violence and islamophobia from non-Muslims. This 
was directly experienced by Muslims in the East End in the form of racist attacks; 
however, it also concerned a heightened alertness to the persecution of Muslims 
abroad, locating themselves in a wider global context. Hence, different geographical 
conceptualizations of “community” will also be crucial to the study by exploring the 
various ways in which the Muslims in the East End dealt with this perception of attack, 
and how these reactions formed part of a global picture. Often these reactions involved 
a rejection of the assimilation policies promoted by the Conservative Party. Reactions 
were visible in the work of community groups which identified themselves as protecting 
Islam from secularism. However, reactions also included a shift in younger Muslims 
towards literalist interpretations of Islam. Yet, what all reactions had in common was a 
widespread shift to look for answers to these problems within the Islamic community 
on a local, national, and global level. This is hugely important in explaining why some 
young Muslims became susceptible to radicalization. 
Methodology and East London as a case study 
In understanding the British Muslim identity and the origins of radicalization it is vital 
to study the community in East London. The East London Mosque in Whitechapel 
during the period analyzed in my study was the largest in the UK at approximately 
60,000 patrons, as well as one of the oldest, with origins dating back to 1910 (The 
Muslim News 1990). Its predominantly Bangladeshi congregation covered the Tower 
Hamlets, Bethnal Green, Stepney, much of Hackney, and played an important part in 
leadership of the national Muslim community, home to organizations such as the Islamic 
Forum for Europe, the Young Muslims Organization (YMO), as well as the Muslim 
Educational Trust. Testament to these, the East London mosque in the early 1990s gained 
a reputation as both a more radical and a more youth-oriented center compared to the 
more culturally Islamic Bangladeshi Brick Lane Great Mosque. The work of John Eade 
and David Garbin have highlighted the importance of the ideological cleavage between 
these two places of worship, and in particular the conflict between secular Bangladeshis 
celebrating Bangladeshi New Year with music and dance, and the “fierce condemnation” 
this brought from the East London Mosque’s leaders who saw it as “unIslamic” (Eade 
and Garbin 2006). The reputation of the mosque has continued into the present day, 
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exemplified most recently by the media focus on events such as the radicalization of 
Shameena Begum, who left her home in Bethnal Green to marry a fighter for the so-
called Islamic State in 2015 (Halliday, Gani and Johnston 2015).
 East London as a wider area is of central importance in the history of the British 
Muslim identity and the development of Islamism. It has historically been one of the most 
multicultural areas in Britain and the history of districts such as Brick Lane document 
the associated frictions and conflicts. Cultures often clashed and a particularly severe 
stretch of racial violence against the Bangladeshi community arose in the early 1990s, 
a violent culmination of long running and smaller National Front attacks on immigrant 
communities in the 1970s (Gilman 2014, 171). The Muslim response to racial attacks in 
the East End exemplified particularly well how an Islamic religious identity, rather than 
racially-oriented identity, achieved the primacy it has today for British Muslims.
 Yet most importantly, one of the main reasons East London gives a particularly 
valuable insight into the development of British Islamism is through the opening of new 
archives at the East London Mosque in 2015, the first mosque ever in the UK to do so. 
The invaluable insight into the development of a community and Islamic identity this 
gave is unparalleled. Along with personal memoirs, local and national news reports, 
metropolitan archival records from the council and a detailed analysis of the burgeoning 
British Muslim newspapers in this era, which have been comparatively understudied, 
they form the bulk of the evidence used in my report. Whilst the development of an 
Islamic identity in East London has thus far been studied from a sociological and 
anthropological perspective, the archives opened up a new way of understanding British 
Islam in this period as a historical process. 
 The study will move forward in four main stages. Chapter One will examine the 
failure of authority figures to deal with racism in East London and how that affected the 
formation of a Muslim identity during the period 1988-1997. Chapter Two will move 
on to look at the experiences of British Muslims as a group who felt their religious way 
of life to be under attack. This chapter includes two case studies to assess the ways in 
which Muslims responded: the ongoing campaign for single-sex Muslim schools and the 
Muslim Women’s Helpline. Chapter Three will detail the effect of ummah on Muslim 
reactions to British foreign policy and global affairs during this period. Discussion 
will center around Muslim reactions to the publication of The Satanic Verses, the first 
Gulf War, and the massacre of Bosnian Muslims from 1992 onwards. These events led 
many Muslims in London to translate their own experiences of discrimination into a 
global landscape of anti-Muslim persecution. The final chapter will explore how all 
these factors combined to create a wider sense among Muslims that they were under 
attack and directly contributed to the growth of Islamism and the spread of anti-Western 




Chapter One: Racism, discrimination and the British Muslim 
identity
“If you refuse to be ‘black’ or ‘Asian’ you don’t exist” (Nahdi and Versi 1995)
 The vast majority of British Muslims were of South Asian, Pakistani, Indian, 
or Bangladeshi origin. This meant that most British Muslims looked distinct from white 
Britons and, like other ethnic minorities, they experienced racism from ethno-nationalist 
groups throughout the late 20th century. Often in the form of violent physical and verbal 
attacks on the streets, it took place in a context where Muslims suffered disproportionately 
from poverty, poor education and, particularly in Tower Hamlets, homelessness. An 
inadequate response from the authorities, this chapter will argue, had a direct effect on 
the Muslim community in the East End: they gave up on looking to the establishment 
for help and began to look for solutions to these problems within their own ranks. More 
specifically, faith became a central factor in social care efforts which had an important 
impact on the religious identity of British Muslims living in the East End.
 One of the most multicultural areas in London, the East End and particularly 
districts such as Brick Lane, experienced prolonged stretches of racist violence towards 
South Asians. The 1970s saw significant amounts of violence shown towards all people 
of color, including Bangladeshis; most famously the violent murder of Bengali Altab 
Ali in 1978 by racists happened in Tower Hamlets. This incident was enshrined into the 
local memory when Altab Ali Park was opened in his remembrance (Gilman 2014, 171). 
However, this legacy of violence towards first generation immigrants continued to affect 
young Muslims born to immigrant families in Britain. In particular, violence escalated 
in the period 1991-92, leading up to the election of a British National Party (BNP) 
Councillor in Millwall, Tower Hamlets. The BNP, a far-right nationalist party, famously 
advocated the repatriation of immigrants of color. In February 1992 Bangladeshis set 
up a rival organization, the Tower Hamlets Anti-Fascist Committee, and 1,500 British 
Bangladeshis marched on April 6th against a BNP election rally taking place that day 
(The Muslim News 1992). This escalation set in motion a series of tit-for-tat attacks, 
including a violent clash in Aldgate in 1993 in which BNP supporters entered Brick 
Lane to distribute leaflets, some performing Nazi salutes and some damaging Asian 
restaurants on the street (Choudhary 1993).
 While these experiences alienated a close knit local community, it was 
the response of the authorities that really changed their approach. There was a deep 
mistrust of the police and their ability to protect Bengali residents; it was the police who 
permitted the BNP supporters to march through Bengali areas. There was particular 
Muslim grievance with the police response to young Bangladeshi men, frequently targets 
of racists. Begum Suratan Nessa, whose son was in a coma following a beating from 
racists, gained national coverage when she protested the acquittal of the attacker without 
charge. “I am frightened” she commented, “those who almost killed him will feel even 
more confident now” (Meyers 1995). Politicians in the area proved unconcerned with 
the violence against immigrant communities. Rather than defending the Bangladeshis, 
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leaflets from Newham South Conservative Association argued Labour were taking part 
in “ethnic cleansing,” preventing white tenants from public housing (Choudhary, Riots 
in the East End 1993). Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats were famously accused of 
pandering to BNP arguments when their party activists issued leaflets which linked 
black and Asian people with the area’s housing shortages. Even Labour, traditionally a 
party of antiracist campaigning had PR problems in January 1994 with two prominent 
resignations of the Secretary and Chairwoman of Labour in Millwall over the party’s 
anti-racist stance made them quit. They commented, “the BNP came in with a slogan 
of “rights for whites” and local people said: “that’ll do for me.” We think that on the 
housing issue local people should be listened to, and as a result we are called all sorts of 
things” (Wintour 1994). 
 Crucially, this response to racism on the streets took place in a context where 
Bangladeshi Muslims suffered disproportionately from homelessness and poverty, 
and their children were more likely to leave school without any qualifications. For 
instance, according to reports from the Tower Hamlets Homeless Families Campaign in 
1988, 95% of families living in temporary bed and breakfast accommodation were of 
Bangladeshi origin (Tower Hamlets Homeless Families Campaign 1988). Episodes of 
cruelty and racism arose from this, such as allegations of abuse of Bangladeshi families 
at a hotel in Finsbury park (Asian Times 1984), as well as evictions, one of which 
involved 70 Bengali homeless families and a case at the High Court (Tower Hamlets 
Homeless Families Campaign 1988). These problems were intimately linked to the 
physical, racial attacks Muslims experienced; the same lukewarm and uncoordinated 
official response pervaded the response to Muslim social welfare concerns. This was 
particularly manifest in the Liberal Democrat councillor’s response to housing problems 
discussed above. Tower Hamlets liberal councillor Andrew Goodchild caused local 
outrage and was referred to the Commission on Racial Equality for his remarks that 
“because of the cultural patterns of the Bangladeshi community they will accept a degree 
of overcrowding for longer periods than is usual among the rest of the community…
an awful lot of people in the existing community say it’s unfair that their children don’t 
have a chance of getting accommodation in the community” (Hackney Gazette and 
North London Advertiser 1989).
 However, in dealing with these problems the extent to which Muslims looked 
to antiracism campaigning for help was limited. Instead, the role of religious groups 
in poverty alleviation and social work was increased. The limited relevance has been 
explored in the findings of sociologists such as Robert Miles and Nassar Meer, the latter 
who claims that the “poverty of understanding” when it came to race meant that Muslims 
were twice as oppressed compared to other religious groups who had their religious 
status recognised (Meer 2010, 75-76). Yet, the extent to which a limited response from 
the authorities prompted the community to take matters of social welfare into their 
own hands has been underexplored. Greater London Council (GLC) records display a 
surge in community associations identifying as “Muslim” in name applying for funding 
during the 1980s1. From Clapton Muslim Welfare Association to the Hackney Muslim 
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Council and the Pakistan Muslim Welfare Association combined religious education with 
poverty alleviation and social welfare activities. Their constitutions were testament to this 
emerging, distinctively Islamic form of social welfare. For instance, Hackney Muslim 
Council stated their top two objectives as “To promote unity amongst the Muslims” and 
“To organize social, religious, cultural, educational, political and sports activities [for the 
unemployed] in the interest of the Muslims” (Hackney Muslim Council). The East London 
mosque also increased its existing services in letter writing, social work and translation as 
well as activities for young people. It played a crucial role in bridging the divide between 
religious practice and poverty alleviation. In their own words: 
  East London is suffering from decades of urban neglect and   
  deprivation, a rising rate of crime and racial harassment. The almost  
  indifferent and apathetic attitude of the central and local authorities  
  leaves the mosque with no other option than to try to fill this gap  
  and support the community in whatever way it can with its scant   
  resources. (Honorary Secretary 1985)
Significantly, many of these Muslim groups included youth work in their social care 
programmes, with Clapton Muslims Welfare Association developing a lively new 
Youth Sub-Committee registered with the authorities. Alongside “discussions, lectures, 
meetings on religious, family, cultural, economic, social and other topics of interest 
to the community” their main pledge was “to work for the cause and to promote the 
understanding of Islam, and to strengthen the bonds of Islamic brotherhood in the 
community” (Clapton Muslim Welfare Association 1980). These events took place in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, before main period of analysis within this study. However, 
they are crucial in understanding how faith was instilled in a younger group of Muslims. 
The combination of social work and religion played a fundamental role in raising a new 
generation who were more religiously aware and had durable effects on young Muslims 
throughout the 1990s discussed in the following chapters. 
The failure of racial politics and the rise of a religious identity 
Racial attacks and discrimination, as we have seen, led to a galvanisation of the Muslim 
community in the East End, marginalized by the slow responses of the authorities to the 
racial issues. Yet the increased response from mosques and Muslim organizations as 
providers of social services were not recognised in the official response. This included the 
response from anti-racism campaigners, local authorities, politicians and the Commission 
for Racial Equality (CRE) which was established by the Race Relations Act in 1976 
as a public, non-departmental body to promote racial equality. The problems Muslims 
faced in Tower Hamlets and in Muslim areas across the country were seen as “color” 
 London Metropolitan Archives holds records of all GLC funding applications. This includes: GLC/RA/
GR/03/036: ‘Clapton Muslim Welfare Association’, GLC/RA/GR/03/07: ‘Hackney Muslim Sports Council’, GLC/




problems, rather than as religious persecution which many believed it was. Muslims, 
due to their predominantly Bangladeshi origin were characterised as “brown,” “Asian,” 
or even “black” by the Commission on Racial Equality (CRE) and antiracist politicians 
on the left such as Diane Abbott, the latter who claimed in an open letter opposing the 
Gulf War “blacks in Hackney were feeling the repercussions” despite that the violence 
was disproportionately against Muslims as a specific group (Hackney Gazette and North 
London Advertiser 1991). The more Muslims felt failed and unprotected by the politics 
of race, the more they identified with and were united by their religion.
 This frustration at the response of the authorities in dealing with this issue led to 
an outpouring of anger from representatives of the Muslim community, largely directed 
at the CRE. The national Muslim press, beginning with The Muslim News, founded in 
1989 by Muslims from Wembley in the wake of the controversy surrounding Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, wrote articles hostile towards the CRE. In particular, they 
criticised its racialized view of minority rights, pushing instead for a recognition of 
religious identity. This is best reflected in a public letter to The Times from Faud Nahdi 
and Ahmed Versi, the editors of Q News and The Muslim News respectively, the two 
widest read Muslim newspapers in the country. Their words not only explain the hostility 
of the Muslim press to the CRE but the extent to which, by 1995, a self-consciously 
religious identity had crystallised in reaction to antiracist efforts. They declared that 
their newspapers were boycotting the black CRE Chairman Herman Ouseley’s call for 
“ethnic minority editors” to support the CRE’s anti-racism measures. They claimed that 
the British reputation for tolerance “is being seriously undermined by the actions and 
attitudes of those who seem intent on refusing to accept and respect our Muslim identity.” 
They saw Ouseley’s call as of “no consequence” to their community, but “most probably 
we will not be missed…because if you refuse to be “black” or “Asian” you don’t exist” 
(Nahdi and Versi 1995).
 Their hostility towards being classified by skin colour over religion stemmed 
from a widespread feeling that antiracist campaigners and secular Britons in general 
did not understand the importance of the Islamic faith to its adherents. For instance, in 
1992 non-Muslim filmmakers at Channel 4 made a documentary named “The Story 
of a Community,” exploring the Bangladeshi Muslim community in the East End. The 
documentary attempted to understand the social and economic problems Muslims in the 
area faced. Yet the Q News TV review of the programme provided a telling reaction to 
mainstream British interpretations of South Asian culture. The programme was criticised 
for its coverage of religious problems, which were “as usual, abandoned” (Khan 1992). 
It claimed the 1992 violence was primarily “anti-Islamic” and that this led to “the older 
generation becoming defensive…and the younger generation even more disenchanted”. 
Yet the Muslim reaction to the documentary took pride that despite the misunderstandings 
of the non-Muslim filmmaker, a strong Islamic message shone through. 
 It may not have been the producers’ intention to look at the role religious identity 
plays in the lives of Bangladeshis in East London but the interviewees tended to speak for 
themselves when they identified religion as an important part of their lives. (Khan 1992)
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 This rejection of categorisation by race in favour of a strong reliance on a 
community of Muslims to solve their problems went unnoticed by the authorities into the 
later 1990s. Yet this development is vital to understanding the foundations of Islamism 
in Britain; feeling besieged and insecure, Muslims stopped looking to secular anti-racist 
groups and the authorities for protection and towards their religion. In a fundamental 
sense they resorted to Islamism, putting faith at the center of issues which might have 
once fallen outside the remit of the mosque such as social welfare and legal protection. 
It was the beginning of a process in which, feeling their faith under attack, they looked 
to defend themselves looking back at the essentials of Islam and its role in the social 
lives of Muslims. As will be explored in the following chapter, the practice of defending 
Islam as at the center of a Muslim’s identity became politicised from the 1980s onwards. 
Chapter 2: Attack on Islamic principles
“Islam is not something that can be learnt and adhered to overnight. It must be lived, 
breathed and fostered until it cannot be separated from life itself”- Union of Muslim 
Organizations (Union of Muslim Organizations 1975, 10)
 
Secular culture, western values and the media
Aside from attacks by racists in the street, facing discrimination and poverty, the growing 
importance of a religious identity meant that many Muslims in the East End increasingly 
felt their religious principles to be under attack just as strongly by secular, western values. 
Government policy did not recognise religious groups in census data and refused to fund 
Muslim schools. Yet there was a wider sense in the community that there was an insidious 
media and secular culture which sought to discredit Islam and push Muslims to abandon 
their faith. Two ideas were particularly powerful in prompting a defensive attitude from 
Muslims. First, the idea that Muslim women were being corrupted by promiscuity and 
irreligion in Western society was powerful. They were seen as particularly vulnerable 
to the effects of gender mixing, for instance. Secondly, elderly and especially devout 
Muslims worried young Muslims would assimilate into Western culture, losing their 
faith and Islamic values along the way, either to Christianity or secularism.
 This sentiment can be observed in varying degrees of strength across the 
community. Among more radical, youth-centered organizations such as the Young 
Muslims Organization (YMO) it was particularly explicit. The YMO, founded in 1988, 
served the younger members of East London Mosque’s congregation (Sookhdeo 2015). 
For instance, the group’s constitution celebrated a cultural wing of Dawatul Islam as 
providing “creative, meaningful and wholesome cultural alternatives to the decadent 
unislamic culture, and combat the dirty and morally repugnant literature” (YMO 1990). 
There was an active sense that they had to fight back, as “just as the weather is cold 
and dry, so are the British people in their attitude towards religion.” They claimed, “we 
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are entrusted to convey the words of Allah…all the more, to the young Bangladeshi 
Muslims who have kept their faiths rekindled, despite the adverse propaganda by the 
media against Islam” (YMO 1990). There was a fear that, as analyzed by McRoy, future 
generations of Muslims would become “brown Sahibs” like Rushdie himself, who hate 
their culture, becoming “morally lose” or apostate (McRoy 2006, 14).
 However, concerns, albeit less strongly worded, were widespread across the 
community. Alcohol and sex outside marriage were strictly condemned as haram under 
Islamic teaching, yet were openly condoned in mainstream British culture. While for 
many the greater danger posed by mainstream British society was atheism, the threat 
of Christianity as a rival faith also loomed. For instance, the Church of England’s 
announcement of a “decade of Evangelism” a few months after the end of the Gulf 
War was received very negatively by the community. Dr Badawi, speaking after an 
emergency meeting of the Imams and Mosques Council and the Muslim College, 
claimed the Church was targeting “Muslims in the UK in order to bring our young 
generation into the Christian fold. Muslims are being discriminated against in education, 
housing and other social services.” He argued that strengthening “Islam in this part 
of the world” or “internal resistance” and in particular, targeting young people would 
“counter the Christian threat” (The Muslim News 1991). 
 Two influential Muslim campaigns, both centered in London are valuable 
examples of the actions many in the community took to preserve their religious principles 
against what they perceived to be an attack. First, a vigorous, long running campaign 
to secure public funding for Muslim single-sex schools. Second, the establishment of 
a helpline providing Islamic solutions to social problem facing Muslim women. Taken 
together, these two London-based campaigns are revealing of a much wider sense of 
unease and victimhood within the Islamic community with the impact western secular 
society was having on British Muslims. Not only did Muslims feel dislocated as outlined 
in the previous chapter, but during this period began to organize to defend the Islamic 
values that set them apart in the first place.
Public funding for Muslim schools
The most immediate and direct way in which Muslims in the 1990s felt their religious 
principles to be threatened directly by government policy was over the issue of Muslim 
schools. The lack of public funding, or what many Muslims saw as the government’s 
refusal to fund single sex Islamic schools, was the most significant way in which Muslims 
both in the East End and across Britain saw their values as under attack. Throughout 
the late 20th century, the fact that Jewish and Christian faith schools were funded by 
the state yet public funding for Muslim schools was denied was a common source of 
Muslim frustration. For instance, in 1989 the Jewish community had secured state aid for 
fifteen primary and five secondary schools despite having a population of only 450,000. 
While there were an estimated one million Muslims in Britain, they had not secured state 
funding for one Islamic faith school (Hiro 1991, 189). However, in the 1990s the political 
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campaign stepped up a notch with increased lobbying efforts from the Muslim Educational 
Trust (MET) and the IQRA educational trust, established in 1990. This perceived sense 
of injustice was regularly covered in significant detail in the Muslim press, with headlines 
such as “Yet another Jewish school gets funding,” and “Calling the lie over Muslim 
Schools” (The Muslim News 1995) (The Muslim News 1989). 
 There were two main ways in which Muslims saw their values as under attack 
through the issue of Muslim schools. Firstly, there was the issue of the mixing of genders, 
discouraged under Islamic teaching. Without public funding for Muslim single-sex 
schools, it was much less likely that Muslim boys and girls would be taught in separate 
classes. The second issue was one of religious education. There was a sense from British 
Muslim campaigners that Britain as a society was either irreligious and secularised, or 
pushing Christian values on Muslim students. This issue led to common cases of parents 
exercising the right to pull their children out of non-Islamic religious studies or sex 
education lessons and campaigning to have Islamic studies examined as an O or A level 
(Union of Muslim Organizations 1975, 9).
 This concern about the erosion of Islamic values as a result of Muslims sending 
their children to secular schools originates in the 1970s, when the wives and families of 
male South Asian migrants began to move to the UK (Hiro 1991). For instance, in the 
Union of Muslim Organizations’ June 1975 pamphlet on “Islamic Education and Single 
Sex Schools” these ideological concerns are strikingly clear. It discusses the “distress” of 
migrant Muslim women on seeing “scantily clad” Western women, and links this shock 
to concerns about Islam in a secular society: “A major worry for Muslim parents is the 
fact that their children soon begin to adopt English standards and ideas.” He claimed 
children could begin to question “religious ideas which seem to be strangely alien to 
life in a Western materialistic society” (Union of Muslim Organizations 1975, 10). 
Running throughout this narrative, hence, is a notion that Western society is corrupting 
and Muslims must come to the defence of the principles of Islam. Each Muslim, it was 
emphasised, has a duty to ensure the “flourishing existence of the Muslim Community 
in Britain depends entirely upon every Muslim in Britain today” (Union of Muslim 
Organizations 1975, 11) and their individual efforts. Muslims must stand by the Quranic 
principles of single-sex Islamic education, if necessary, “in defence of Muslim girl 
absenteeism from secondary schools” (Union of Muslim Organizations 1975, 14).
 Yet these concerns persisted into the 1990s; laws on funding had not changed. 
This is evident from the dialogue between the East London mosque and the Muslim 
Educational Trust (MET). In their 1992 official feedback document from the Muslim 
community to the Department of Education following the government’s White Paper 
on “Choice and Diversity,” the East London Mosque office and the MET spokesperson 
argued: “It cannot be denied that this society’s moral and spiritual moorings are rather 
adrift and need to be strengthened.” They continued that without religious education, 
teaching morality is “neither feasible nor possible. It is the consciousness of our 
responsibility and accountability to our Supreme Creator that decide the spirituality and 
morality of a person” (Muslim Educational Trust 1992, 1). This is evidently a more 
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complex argument than simply that they deserve the right to choose a faith school as 
a minority to preserve culture. The feedback raised strong objection to section 8[3] of 
the Education Reform Act which stipulated that national religious education syllabuses 
should “reflect the fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main 
Christian” (Muslim Educational Trust 1992, 4). They saw it as a hostile piece of 
legislation negatively impacting Muslim communities. 
 The failure of nationwide Muslim education campaigns meant that by the 1990s, 
Muslims in the East End began to take matters into their own hands. Muslims including 
the Bangladeshis Educational Needs in Tower Hamlets (BENTH) and Bangladesh 
Parents Association in Tower Hamlets (BPATH) wrote to the Inner London Education 
Authority (ILEA) to ask for their Labour leader Neil Fletcher to withdraw his “latest 
exhibition of anti-Muslim ignorance.” Fletcher had argued segregated schools would 
“pave the way for apartheid in British education” and “set back the struggle of British 
Muslim women for equal rights” (The Muslim News 1990). Muslims in Tower Hamlets 
launched an East London schools programme in which they wrote to parents to change 
some predominantly Bangladeshi schools into “model schools in accordance with 
Islam.” This included banning sex education lessons and teaching English as a third 
language (The Muslim News 1990). Yet this campaign was limited in its effect, unable 
to implement the holistic curricular change activists at the MET advocated.
 This long-standing grievance, which had existed as long as Muslim families had 
lived in the UK, went unresolved until the election of the Labour party in 1997, when 
Tony Blair’s election campaign embraced multiculturalism and funding for faith schools 
(Tomlinson 2008, 126). While the Muslim community were ultimately successful in 
their struggle, the extent to which this was due to Muslim campaigning is questionable. 
Longstanding feelings of isolation and practice in resistance and campaigning would 
have a lasting effect, bringing the community together. It included prominent figures 
within the London Muslim community, famously Yusuf Islam (also known as Cat 
Stevens). The length of the fight for recognition brought Muslims together as much as 
their lack of success until the new millennium isolated them, their values and political 
beliefs from the rest of British society. Yet more importantly, feeling their values under 
attack, they turned to Islam as a social counter-narrative to that provided by British 
society, Islamism in a basic sense.
Muslim Women’s Helpline 
As shown in the role of single-sex education in the campaign for Muslim schools, Muslim 
women and girls in British Muslim communities became politicised as a defensive tactic 
against secular culture. This persisted into the 1990s. In response to newspaper reports 
of exorcisms or honour killings in which young Muslim women were murdered by their 
families (Levin 1992); the idea that secular feminists were leading Muslim women to 
diverge from the teachings of their faith had become a common theme in community 
discourse. For instance, at the Young Muslim’s annual summer camp in 1991, attended 
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by over 3000 young Muslims from across England, Rahanah Sadiq one of the prominent 
speakers argued “feminism makes girls lose all their femininity” she added “the mother 
is the linchpin of the family” (The Muslim News 1991). There was a sense that feminism 
was an inherently white and secular concept that undermined the traditional role of the 
women in the family. 
 London-based Muslim Women’s Helpline (MWH) became operational in 1989, 
set up by a panel of eight young Muslim women with backgrounds in social work from 
the Islamic Cultural Center. A confidential advice line for Muslim women suffering from 
problems arising from divorce, abusive husbands, teenage children, family members 
sexually assaulting daughters and being a single parent. It sought to find solutions for 
Muslim women to such social problems that were often taboo within the community, 
from people who understood their faith and social context. It was immensely successful, 
in the first three years dealing with 3000 calls from London Muslim women (Muslim 
Womens Helpline 1992).
 Yet the Helpline made no secret of the strategy underpinning its foundation. 
As much as it existed to help the Muslim women and girls in abusive relationships, it 
was as much a protection of the Muslim faith. “For every new convert to Islam”, the 
Women’s Helpline argued, “there were perhaps five “born” Muslim women and girls 
being led away from the faith”. The women facing social problems, it was argued, see 
their problems as resolved “not by Muslims who shunned them but by non-Muslims. 
These girls and women were prey to secularists and feminists” (Muslim Womens 
Helpline 1992). The Women’s Helpline would frequently hark back to these principles 
when asking the community for funding as opposed to marketing the helpline as a purely 
philanthropic exercise. In 1991, when funds were running particularly low, the Helpline’s 
paper made this explicit, drawing on Muslim disquiet at the Church of England’s launch 
of a “decade of evangelism” in December 1991.
 It seems particularly important with the Decade of Evangelism upon us (and 
its implicit interest in preying on the vulnerable and isolated which often means 
women and children) that the Helpline should not be allowed to collapse because it is 
a unique Islamic service to the Muslim community and in supporting women who are 
the corner-stone of the family it is helping to stabilize and strengthen Muslim society 
as a whole. (Muslim Womens Helpline 1990)
 The MWH is part of something much bigger, self-consciously locating itself 
in a wider debate about the future of Islam in the face of western secularism. Sara 
Sherrif, a prominent community figure as a founding member and deputy editor of 
The Muslim News warned that the British Muslim community would have “nobody 
but itself to blame social and familial disharmony and strife emerges more often than 
at present to damage the already battered image of Islam” (Muslim Womens Helpline 
1990). The ideological as well as philanthropic mission of the Helpline highlights 
the way in which social work simultaneously became a political action centered 
on the protection of Islam, which will also be observed in the work of the Young 
Muslims Organization in the following chapter. As well as a philanthropic success, it 
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was another strategic reaction; the Muslim community was reforming from within to 
defend its religious values from external attack.
Chapter 3: A civilization under attack: the narrative of global 
Islamic revivalism
“My nationality is Islam” – Saleem Siddiqi (Siddiqi, Dr 1999)
 When the prophet Muhammed migrated from Mecca to Medina in June 622, 
known as al-Hijrah, he enacted the first demonstration of what is now called ummah, or 
the global Muslim community. Understanding ummah and its central position in the core 
spiritual beliefs of all Muslims, including British Muslims, is essential in explaining the 
importance of the global events in shaping the discourses of Muslims in East London, 
in Britain and across the Western world. A sense that the global ummah was under 
immediate threat transformed the anxiety and malaise that underpinned the issues 
discussed in previous chapters into open, forceful opposition. During the formative 
period of 1988-1995, three events took place which triggered the development of an 
alternative discourse at odds with British government policy and public opinion. These 
were the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, the outbreak of the Gulf War 
and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims from 1992-1995, before NATO action. 
Community organizations such as the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs and the 
Muslim Parliament were formed to provide a platform for a British Muslim discourse 
on these events. They were unanimous in condemning the Satanic Verses, united in 
a scepticism of Western motives waging war against a Muslim leader in Iraq, and 
universally outraged at John Major’s inaction despite the slaughter of Bosnian Muslims. 
The effects of these events on the East London Muslim community were profound.
 Largely thanks to this concept of ummah, the Muslim community in Britain 
took a great interest in global politics, particularly where Muslim majority countries 
were involved. As well as tracking the welfare of Muslims in their diaspora countries 
such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India, they took an active interest in members of the 
ummah in Palestine, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. This is powerfully exemplified 
in the content and layout of the two largest British Muslim newspapers during this 
period, The Muslim News and Q News. Despite identifying in their slogans as the “News 
and Views of Muslims in the United Kingdom” and “Britain’s only Muslim weekly” 
respectively, the layout of both these newspapers illustrates that the affairs of the global 
ummah and the affairs of British Muslims were prioritised equally. On their front pages 
the headlines, “Christians on killing spree of Muslims” would sit side by side with “CRE 
and ICRC to launch leaflets on religious discrimination” (The Muslim News 1996). 
Beneath the headline “Panic on Cairo streets” a report on the Egyptian earthquake that 
“shocked the Muslim world” was a feature on Qur’anic readings on BBC radio (Q News 
1992). The Muslim News ran a “Washington Diary” with a permanent correspondent 
monitoring US foreign policy towards Muslims, while the Bosnian war consumed the 
headlines of Q News. Smaller publications such as Impact International exclusively 
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covered the affairs Muslim community around the world. This blurring of boundaries 
between foreign and domestic news is telling; this was a community highly sensitive 
to developments more likely to have profound personal responses to foreign affairs 
affecting the wellbeing of members of the ummah.
 The publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988 was the first 
watershed in the development of this British Muslim alternative discourse. The outrage, 
anger and disappointment felt by British Muslims led to a profound sense of isolation and 
disaffection which would characterise their experience in the decade to follow. After the 
Ayatollah made his fatwa against Rushdie, permitting Muslims to lawfully assassinate 
him, Khomeini became a publicly popular figure whose image was frequently appeared 
on placards in protests across the country (The Muslim News 1989). In a demonstration 
organized by the British Muslim Action Committee over 80,000 Muslims converged on 
London on May 27, 1989 to have the book banned under English blasphemy laws. In 
the East London Mosque, a petition was circulated, signed by hundreds, calling the book 
“a stab in the back for the Muslims of the world” (The Society of Muslim Scholars UK 
1989) and was supplemented by large protests in the immediate aftermath. 
 Yet politically, in East London, the situation was fraught with tension and 
division. The crisis had highlighted the inadequacy of antiracist politicians to fight for 
Muslim concerns. Black London MP Paul Boateng who often campaigned for racial 
justice dismissed Muslim anger as having nothing to do with the “black discourse” 
(McRoy 2006, 10). Meanwhile, Hackney North MP Diane Abbott became embroiled in 
a dispute. Despite being a long-time ally of ethnic minority causes, she denied that the 
book should be banned under free speech. Abbott was attacked by Hackney Pakistani 
Welfare Association after she said any calls for censorship by fundamentalist religious 
leaders should be resisted. Iqbaluddin Ahmad, chair of the Association said he was 
“surprised and disappointed by her comments” (Melody 1989). Calling the book “filthy 
and provocative,” he argued, “Salman Rushdie has provoked one million Muslims of 
the world yet Diane Abbott is unable to support the call for banning his book” (Melody 
1989). The crisis was also an important contributing factor in the Muslim rejection of 
an identity based on race and a move towards a religious identification. The CRE’s lack 
of concern over the issue and the lack of support from MPs such as Abbott acted as a 
catalyst for Muslims to form a self-consciously Muslim political identity. 
 A plethora of Muslim organizations formed after 1988, giving British Muslims 
a platform in which to react to events such as the publication of the Satanic Verses. This 
included the first self-consciously British Muslim newspaper, The Muslim News, which 
identified as the “News and Views of Muslims in the United Kingdom.” The United 
Kingdom Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) also formed in October 1988 
as was the Muslim Parliament, headed by the Islamic activist Kalim Siddiqi. Both these 
organizations aimed to coordinate and publicise British Muslim narratives on current 
affairs and issues of Muslim interest. McRoy’s seminal work From Rushdie to 7/7: The 
Radicalisation of Islam in Britain gives the concept of ummah the place it deserves, at 
the center of understanding how British foreign policy had powerful, sometimes radical 
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effects on the Muslim population. However, McRoy’s and Rutheven’s focus on power 
struggles within the Muslim community as a result of the Rushdie crisis, such as the rise 
of more hard line religious groups is key to understanding the process which the Rushdie 
crisis set in motion. As McRoy argues:
  The Satanic Verses provided the Mawdudists and other hard-liners the  
  opportunity to increase their influence, vindicating their thesis that no  
  compromise is possible between the absolute truths of Islam and the  
  falsehoods of the infidel, jahili West. (McRoy 2006, 11)
However, while this effect was immediately observable in areas such as Bradford, most 
notably through the infamous book-burning in a protest, in the East End the effects 
were not as immediately observable. This effect of the Rushdie affair in London would 
have its greatest impact in the context of further crises which would further isolate the 
Muslim community. 
 Only a year later the outbreak of the Gulf War was to exacerbate tensions. On 
August 12, 1990, immediately after military intervention began, a declaration following a 
meeting of 35 UK Muslim organizations condemned the presence of non-Muslim troops 
in the Gulf. In a joint press statement, they agreed: “we cannot tolerate the intervention 
of non-Muslim powers in this essentially internal Muslim affair” (The Muslim News 
1990). In light of this Muslim disquiet, Pnina Werbner’s seminal anthropological study 
of rhetoric at a conference of Pakistani Muslims in Manchester during the Gulf War is 
of crucial relevance. Her language analysis of the arguments made revealed the way 
in which global events were directly incorporated into local experiences of Muslims. 
British foreign policy in many ways was not foreign at all to British Muslims but instead 
was presented as an extension of their experience at home: as Werbner concluded, for 
Muslims in Manchester “the local and the global are mutual constitutive” (Werbner 
1994, 216). Yet more crucially, she discussed the Muslim rejection of what is termed 
“axiomatic moral imperatives,” such as “our boys” fighting for peace and Saddam 
Hussein as a dictator. The notion that Saddam was a malicious despot, for instance, 
was rejected by large numbers of British Muslims, and as a result there was a sense 
that Muslims were “[setting] themselves morally apart from British society” (Werbner 
1994, 217). This contrasted with widespread British support for the war and increased 
the isolation felt by Muslims in Britain, fostering a sense of disaffection with their 
government, which they felt represented the opposite of their world view.
 In the East End, the effects of the Gulf War were felt acutely. Matching a rise in 
violence against Muslims across the North of England in 1991, committee members of 
the Iraqi Community Association in Dalston were sent death threats. A spokesperson for 
the headquarters told the local newspapers: “They tell us that our days are numbered and 
if anyone gets hurt in the Gulf we’ll pay for it. We’ve also been sent an “official” Iraqi 
calendar, with all the pages ripped out after January 15 – the deadline Saddam Hussein 
was set to withdraw from Kuwait” (Fowler 1991). The fact that the Iraqi Community 
Association opposed Saddam as a dictator yet still fell victim to violence from the white 
British population reinforced a sense of being under attack. Hence they saw themselves 
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as “victims not only of Saddam Hussein, but of the British as well” (Fowler, 1991). 
While they rejected Saddam, the Muslims at the Iraqi community center continued to 
locate themselves in a global narrative of persecution and isolation.
 This sense of alienation was widespread in the community, yet the opposition 
Iraqis in Hackney exhibited towards Saddam was not matched by other Muslims in 
the East End. Manzila Paula Uddin, a Muslim Labour councillor in Tower Hamlets 
described the sentiments she felt within her predominantly Bangladeshi and Pakistani 
community: “we want to be British Muslims and I feel there is no clash of loyalties 
in being both. But it is other people who are forcing us to take sides.” She spoke of 
an “anti-Muslim attitude in the country…which is no longer war related but has been 
strengthened by the war” (Chaudhary and Hill 1991). This exemplified a wider sense 
of being under attack from the outside and a need for Muslims to decide where their 
loyalties lie. Uddin’s experience from talking to constituents revealed a youth more 
confrontational and strident in challenging the narratives circulating in Britain about the 
Iraq war. She argued that young Muslim men had begun “drawing on the very essence 
of militant Islam. Many of them said they supported Saddam because it’s the first time 
they’ve known a Muslim leader stand up to the West” (Chaudhary and Hill 1991). As 
Werbner highlighted, it was this refusal to accept established British “axiomatic moral 
imperatives” that further isolated Muslims from the majority of British public opinion. 
In the same way that racism, secularism and media portrayal caused Muslims in the 
East End to turn their back on mainstream British beliefs and value sets, British foreign 
policy had a similar effect. 
 Moreover, this sense of alienation from British ideas about the war strengthened 
the sense of solidarity with the ummah in many young people. Nearly a decade later, 
Mohammad Omar, 25, who grew up in Hackney who had trained as a Mujahedeen with 
guerrilla fighters in Pakistan, specifically identified the Gulf War as a key moment in his 
journey to jihad abroad, describing himself and “many others” as “shaken by the Gulf 
War.” He selected a key moment from when his youth in the aftermath of the Gulf War 
which made a profound mark on his worldview: “I saw Hizb ut-Tahrir debating at SOAS 
with intellectuals, like deans, who quite frankly got trashed by them. They seemed to 
provide a solution” (Vasagar 2000). Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) did not advocate protest through 
established channels such as writing to MPs or political lobbying and often preached that 
Muslims voting in the UK was forbidden under Islam. As will be outlined in the following 
chapter, their reactions to these global events did not just contrast with British axiomatic 
moral imperatives, they openly declared war on them. HT advocated extreme reactions 
to the events of the Gulf, most notably when Omar Bakri Muhammed, a HT leader at 
the time, put the group in the national headlines when he proclaimed “[John] Major is 
a legitimate target; if anyone gets the opportunity to assassinate him, I don’t think they 
should save it. It is our Islamic duty and we will celebrate his death” (Taji-Farouki 1996, 
181). The fact that such radical ideas were inspiring young Muslims as a direct result of the 
Gulf War is emblematic of the changes that were taking place: practicing Islam and being 
represented by the British government, for some, was becoming contradictory. 
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 It was clear that by 1992 British Muslims in the East End were greatly concerned 
about the wellbeing of the global ummah. By the time stories emerged of Muslim 
persecution in Bosnia almost immediately after the Gulf War, its impact on the British 
Muslim community was especially grave. The starkest reactions to this war came from 
the now active group HT. Jonathan Bronitsky’s analysis highlights the ways in which 
HT used the inaction of the British government in the face of the massacre of Bosnian 
Muslims to argue that Muslims, even if they were white and secular as in Bosnia, would 
never be safe in the west. This was particularly observable in the East End, which became 
a center of activism over Bosnia. Ed Husain, who was a student at Tower Hamlets 
College in 1993 but who went on to become a HT leader was particularly active in 
promoting this narrative. He booked a lecture theatre at the college under the title “The 
Killings Fields at Bosnia” to raise awareness of the conflict and collect donations for 
Bosnian Muslims. He prepared for a talk titled “Bosnia Today – Brick Lane Tomorrow,” 
by distributing over 30,000 leaflets to houses, markets and mosques. The event’s title 
specifically targeted British Muslims’ sense of unease, arguing that what happened to 
the Bosnian European Muslims could happen to them. The event consisted of a protest 
march through the Newham entitled “Concerned Muslims Living in Tower Hamlets” 
(Bronitsky 2010, 13). In student unions across London with high proportions of Muslim 
students, from SOAS to LSE, HT used “Bosnia weeks” to show more brutal films and 
images of the war and recruit young Muslims to the organization (Evans 1994). HT 
planned to use the sense of unease in the community exacerbated by the Bosnian issue 
to advance their anti-Western message. 
 However, Brotinsky’s argument does not explore the much wider impact the 
arguments made about Bosnia had on the British Muslim community. In East London, 
the same area where HT focused their efforts, this concern was more expansive than 
a radical student group. Fundraising efforts were intense and between 1992 to 1993 
the mosque congregation gave £1000 in donations to charities helping Muslims in 
Bosnia, which is especially significant given that it was only £300 less than what the 
congregation gave to Bangladesh, the home country of the vast majority of the local 
community (East London Mosque 1992-1993). Sermons began to warn the dawa, or 
the Muslim community, to make brothers aware of “on-going Muslim oppressions in 
Palestine, Kashmir, Algeria, India and Bosnia” (East London mosque 1992-1993) and 
the questions it raised about being Muslim in the UK. 
 “After Rushdie, the Gulf War, and now Bosnia, I have been forced to describe 
myself in terms of religion,” wrote Nasreen Rehman in 1993, an influential London 
academic and writer. “For 20 years I have never felt that being a Muslim was a problem. 
Then it changed” (Alibhai-Brown 1993). These three global events, particularly when 
examined together, reveal a watershed in how British Muslims as a collective identified. 
Most importantly, after each event Islamist messages advocating mistrust of mainstream 
British discourse gained ground. Increasingly, Muslims began to look to Islam as a faith 
and as a community for protection. First, many Muslims in the East End believed the 
Rushdie crisis proved they could not trust non-Muslim anti-racist campaigners to advance 
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their aims. As Meer highlights, a disjuncture emerged between how others viewed Muslims 
and how Muslims viewed themselves (Meer 2010, 77). Second, the Gulf War was seen by 
many as a sign that the British government and international organizations such as the UN 
did not understand or value the concept of ummah or the sanctity of Muslim holy sites. 
Third, for some Muslims the slaughter of Bosnian Muslims and British inaction raised 
concerns about the ability of Muslims to ever be accepted into or fully protected in a non-
Muslim society. Instead, they should look towards their faith for security. Following these 
events, the reaction of British Muslims to the War on Terror in 2001 was hardly surprising. 
Even the Muslim Mayor of Hackney, Saleem Siddiqi, a public servant well integrated 
into the local government establishment (a councillor since 1990) claimed he had to avoid 
discussing international affairs with other politicians, including with councillors of his own 
party to minimise conflict: “he will not understand the point of view of mine” (Siddiqi, 
Millennium Memory Bank 1999). An acute awareness of the condition of the ummah 
around the world and its contrast with the foreign policy the government pursued at that 
time hence contributed to a sense of alienation from the establishment and a predisposition 
towards Islamist messages.
Chapter 4: Youth, radicalization and Islamism
“Our call for [jihad] in Bosnia was not limited to east London but heard all across the 
UK. As we predicted, the ummah, once given the idea, delivered” – Ed Husein, Hitzb-
ut-Tahrir (Husein 2007)
 While some of the responses to feelings of marginalization from Muslims in the 
context of the East End were social work or political campaigning, a minority of Muslims, 
particularly young people, turned to extreme Islamist messages as a solution. Radical 
groups in London, mainly Hitzb-ut-Tahrir, (and later its splinter group al-Muhajiroun) 
took on common Muslim grievances with Britain’s foreign policy, protecting Islamic 
values and placing religion at the center of the identity of second generation immigrant 
Muslims. This ideology, a new Islamism, most visible at the time in HT’s messages 
was Islamist in an exclusive way, arguing that living a social and political life fully in 
accordance with Muslim values ipso facto meant opposing the British state and society. 
The polarising messages of these groups were far from resonating with all Muslim youth 
at this time, but in the early-mid 1990s extremist messages were much more prevalent 
in youth groups and student unions, in large part as a result of deliberate and incessant 
targeting by HT. 
 HT were founded in 1953 as a pan-Islamic organization seeking to unify Muslim-
majority countries into an Islamic caliphate. By the late 1980s HT had established cells 
throughout the Middle East and Central and South Asia, aiming to infiltrate militaries 
to facilitate HT a coup (Ahmed and Stewart 2010, 158). A British branch of HT was 
founded in 1986 when Omar Bakri Muhammad, a hard-line Islamic preacher, moved 
to Britain from Syria. They soon grew rapidly in London, flooding student unions and 
youth Islamic Societies with debates and leaflets inviting them to mass rallies. Although 
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it was a trans-national group, HT in Britain quickly took on its own identity as English-
speaking and oriented towards second-generation Muslims feeling an identity clash 
between Islamic and secular British values (Nawaz 2012). Much of HT’s recruiting 
power lay in appropriating sentiments common in the Muslim community, such as 
concerns about British foreign policy, taking them to radical new levels. In response to 
concerns about Western secular culture, for instance, HT chose a militant approach; they 
spread posters around East London campuses of Muslim women in face veils carrying 
AK-47s. It was captioned: “Women of the West – Cover Up or Shut Up” (Nawaz 2012, 
71). These posters were created with an intent to polarise; offending white students and 
presenting an uncomfortable dichotomy between Britain and their faith for Muslims in 
these colleges. HT claimed they were simply following through on Qur’anic messages 
and protecting the ummah, and their message presented Muslim and British society as 
diametrically opposed.
 East London, home to one of the largest Muslim communities in the UK, became 
an important recruiting ground for HT. They targeted young people in Sixth Form colleges 
across East London using sleek propaganda and quick-witted, articulate students in 
public debates. For one such student, ex-HT leader Maajid Nawaz, the Newham College 
campus in East Ham, East London played a key part in the development of his own 
extremist ideology. A second-generation Pakistani immigrant and a member of HT, he 
became president of the Newham College Student Union at 16 years old (Nawaz 2012, 
69). He directed funding for the Islamic Society towards the group and away from more 
traditionally religious and less political factions. According to Nawaz’s accounts, religious 
acts such as prayer were politicised and performed on the streets before rival non-Muslim 
gangs. Often, students would stay up all night making propaganda posters with religious 
messages and then inundating student unions the following day. Yet HT student activists 
felt their “victory in the student elections felt as though it was part of a bigger picture” 
(Nawaz 2012, 70). HT knew how to make an impact and held rallies across London 
during this period, using colleges such as Newham as a base. The energy and charisma 
of the group, gathering in prominent locations such as Wembley Stadium and Trafalgar 
square gathered 7-8,000 at a time. Their “Rally for Islam” in 1995 boasted converting 50 
non-Muslims in one day, including passers-by through the “intellectual persuasion” (The 
Muslim News 1995) of the educated young HT members there. Their anti-government 
rhetoric appealed to the young and their message of redemption from the “excesses” of 
Western society such as drug abuse resonated with disillusioned students searching for 
greater meaning in their lives (The Muslim News 1995). 
 Undoubtedly, HT were prominent and well-known, particularly among young 
Muslim circles in London during this period. However despite this, only a small minority 
of young Muslims actually joined groups such as HT or campaigned to advocate their 
messages. The situation in the East London mosque at this time can, however, tell a story 
of the wider impact an extreme form of Islamism had. Many of the messages similar to 
those HT put out gained hold in more mainstream religious organizations in East London. 
For the first time, there was a much wider sense that, as Hiro concluded, “young people, 
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unlike their first-generation parents, began to study Islam as an ideology rather than a 
ritual” (Hiro 1991, 188). By the mid-late 1990s this Islamist effect was beginning to 
become clear among young people in the congregation of the East London Mosque. 
 The youth wing of the East London Mosque’s Islamic Forum of Europe, the 
Young Muslims Organization (YMO), is a strong example of a more mainstream 
organization impacted by a more fundamental type of Islamist resurgence. Founded in 
1988 by East End Bangladeshis, it served the younger members of East London Mosque’s 
congregation (Sookhdeo 2015). For Ed Husain, an East London Muslim of Bangladeshi 
origin who later became a prominent HT radical, the YMO was a springboard into some 
of the arguments the most extreme Islamists were making. He was recruited by them in 
particular due to his “restlessness” and the “training” (Husein 2007, 121) he received 
in leafletting, debating and publicising messages at YMO. Attending the East London 
mosque, he was involved in a YMO effort to spread their messages across the local 
area and beyond, particularly in schools. The posters it propagated, like HT’s, targeted 
students: “Most students travelled to and from the Poplar campus by bus, walking from 
the bus stop…they walked past gold-painted graffiti proclaiming “Islam is the Solution” 
and, beneath that, “YMO”” (Hiro 1991, 122). While their messages, prominent in 
schools such as tower Hamlets College did not campaign against British foreign policy 
in the same way as HT, they were still Islamist in the sense that they strongly advocated 
going back to Islamic teaching for principles by which to live. 
 The YMO official policy document for 1995 exemplifies this, addressing two 
key issues with striking clarity and fundamentalism. The first is the issue of the mixing 
of genders in schools. Rather than simply arguing that mixing should be discouraged or 
avoided, the YMO went one step further, arguing that the mixing of women with non-
Muslim men, in education and the workplace is haram, or forbidden. They argued “the 
Prophet (SAW) discouraged women to pray even in the Masjid so that they don’t come 
in contact with men Sahabas, so how is it possible for us to allow free mixing” (YMO, 
Young Muslims Organization Policy Document Appendix 1 1990). Even “looking” 
at the opposite sex is identified as zina, which is the Islamic legal term for unlawful 
sexual intercourse, “because it is by look that people enjoy the beauty of the opposite 
sex” (YMO, Young Muslims Organization Policy Document Appendix 1 1990, 11). The 
second, more controversial issue explored was the topic of women’s rights to leadership. 
The YMO concluded in the first few lines of this section that: “In Islam, women 
leadership is unlawful. There is enough evidence of this in the Qur’an and Hadith” 
(YMO 1990, 13). They claimed the Qur’an only permits women to be leaders among 
other women, where she will not have regular contact with unmarried men unrelated to 
her. They YMO argued “the fact that women are not considered fully matured in wisdom 
and decisiveness is proven by the statement in the Qur’an that women’s evidence is half 
that of men. Allah says “And get two witnesses out of your own men, and if there are not 
two men, then a man and two women.”” (YMO 1990, 14). This is powerful in its context 
as a departure from mainstream politics towards a society governed solely according 
to Islam. The UK had just emerged from over a decade of leadership from Margaret 
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Thatcher. Benazir Bhutto was at that time Prime Minister of Pakistan. The YMO 
effectively implied that for Muslims, these leaders should technically be illegitimate, 
undermining a basic aspect of living in British society. 
 This policy document exemplifies accurately the lengths to which the YMO 
advocated going to live by the principles in Islamic texts. This form of Islamism went 
beyond simply looking to religion and the ummah for social, political and spiritual 
guidance; it thoroughly rejected as un-Islamic basic aspects of living in Britain and 
most other countries in the world. Yet while HT and the YMO took extreme and literalist 
interpretations of religion, many of the arguments these groups made shared the same 
core concerns as many other sectors of the Muslim community. For instance, the Muslim 
Women’s Helpline worried about the Church of England’s “decade of evangelism” as 
HT preached about a Christian crusade in the Gulf. The concerns raised by the Union of 
Muslim Organizations about gender mixing and secular schools as discussed in Chapter 
1 were shared by the YMO, who advocated firmer adherence to religious texts on 
gender. This did not mean disagreements between radical and moderate Islamists were 
not fierce. For instance, at a protest about Bosnia in 1992 at which 3000 people rallied 
in Trafalgar Square to end “Holocaust 1992,” the Muslim press chastised the extremists 
as “a small but vocal minority of Muslim hooligans” who “unfolded a banner marked 
“Jihad” and began to heckle and shout down the speakers” (Q News 1992) and “short 
sighted airheads.” Yet Q News also believed in intervention to stop the slaughter of 
Bosnian Muslims, and in fact criticised the “hooligans” for not doing enough: “Actions, 
not words brothers!...Why were they in Trafalgar Square and not Sarajevo?” (Sheikh 
1992). The radical messages HT advocated during this period were damaging the 
credibility of what Muslims saw to be a worthy cause. 
Conclusion
“We must be clear: the ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem; legitimate 
religious belief emphatically is not.”– Theresa May, Prevent Strategy Foreword, 2011
 Opening the relaunch of the UK government’s Prevent strategy against violent 
extremism, the then-Home Secretary Theresa May claimed the primary result of the 
programme would be to “respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat 
from those who promote it” (Home Office 2011). Government strategy since then has 
centered around drawing a sharp distinction between an “extreme” and a “moderate” 
ideology and chastising groups, including HT, that failed this test of extremism. 
Underpinning this strategy is the assumption that the arguments of groups which 
“oppose our values of universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy and 
full participation in our society” (Home Office 2011) do not share the same concerns 
as the vast majority of Muslims, even though they overwhelmingly reject the violence, 
extremism and divisive rhetoric of groups such as HT. Yet the study of the East End has 
shown while the measures employed by different groups within the Muslim community 
varied, their concerns and the marginalization they experienced was broadly similar. 
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Members of the East London Mosque, the Muslim Educational Trust, the editors of 
The Muslim News and young HT members alike felt that both Muslims and Islamic 
principles across the world were under attack and should be protected.
 I have analyzed the role the period c.1988-1997 and the historical developments 
which took place in it in their own right, exploring the reactions of British Muslims in 
the East End to evolving global and national circumstances. Remedying some of the 
myopia in current research, I have sought to draw greater attention to pre-9/11 events as 
causes of today’s divisions and the foundations of Islamism in Britain. As this paper has 
explored, the Muslim experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s was characterised 
by isolation, anxiety and mistrust of the government and secular British culture. The 
community in the East End responding to key issues such as racism, poverty, the Rushdie 
crisis and British foreign policy vis-à-vis the ummah by looking for support and comfort 
within their faith. Many lost confidence in their government and the principles of British 
society. Through measures such as the Muslim Women’s Helpline and educational trusts 
they sought to protect their religion from threats on the outside. This is Islamist in a 
basic sense; a turn towards leading a life more guided by Islam as a reaction to external 
threats and insecurities. The responses of groups such as HT in Britain and organizations 
like the YMO were variations on a common concern.
 Examining the concerns and reactions of the British Muslim community before 
9/11 in this way has another important effect, rationalising the study of Islamism in 
Britain. Understanding the origins of the social marginalization that many Muslims still 
feel today makes it much easier to examine the core arguments and concerns of more 
extreme forms of Islamism and why they appealed to some Muslims in the first place. 
Archival efforts within Muslim communities across the UK such as that of the East 
London Mosque Archives are crucial to these efforts. Continuing research into the pre-
9/11 period, consequently, can go some way in penetrating complex and intractable 
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